Grab Bankruptcy

Under Tennessee law as predicted by a Dallas bankruptcy attorney court in that state, the filing of a financing statement under a debtor’s assumed name, even an assumed name under which the debtor was registered to do business in Tennessee, was insufficient to perfect a creditor’s security interest, in the event that this naming error made the financing statement seriously misleading. However, genuine issue of material fact as to whether the naming error made the financing statements seriously misleading precluded entry of summary judgment on the Chapter 7 trustee’s strong-arm avoidance claim.

A provision in a confirmed Chapter 13 plan treating a Dallas mortgage foreclosure assignee’s lien as invalid could not be deemed to be final and controlling when the debtor failed to pursue the invalidity of the lien through the adversary proceeding required by rule, which established the level of process to which the assignee was entitled, under due process principles, before being deprived of its property interest in the lien. Any actual knowledge that the assignee had regarding the plan’s treatment of its lien did not eliminate its due process right to the service of a complaint and summons. A dissenting opinion took the view that due process was satisfied with respect to the invalidation of the assignee’s lien notwithstanding the debtor’s rule violation.

There was no clear error in a Texas Dallas Fort Worth bankruptcy court’s determination that a debtor filed a Chapter 7 petition in bad faith. The debtor was a doctor who had an income of nearly $200,000 per year. Her husband also made about $200,000 per year. The debtor failed to show up for creditor meetings, failed to produce sufficient documentation, transferred jewelry to family members for inadequate consideration, and failed to provide straightforward answers regarding her expenses.

Having filed a proof of claim in its own name against the Chapter 13 debtors’ estate, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) was barred, by principles of waiver and estoppel, from objecting when the debtors responded in like fashion and filed an objection naming the IRS, discharge taxes Dallas, rather than the United States, as respondent. The debtors’ objection was solely defensive in nature and could not be analogized to a “suit” for affirmative relief, such as would have to be filed against the United States rather than the IRS. Furthermore, the debtors’ objection was properly served on the IRS at the address indicated on its proof of claim as being the place to which notices should be sent.